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Third, 
to to 
a controlled substance. As of his guilty plea, he the to challenge 
denying 
and detained 
consent to empty 
to 
2014, at 5:00 
Post Falls Police Department 
LLH,~LUH; on a shoplifting call. 
unusual his training his 
events to some and "'-''''"''"'''" 
items on the way out. 
Harrison's officer 
and was 
Finally, Mr. consent 
at to 
... or a few after 
was sent to Wal-Mart out near 
it is not 
shoplifting 
for 
And so he \Vas advised that there was-when he arrived at the scene, 
apparently the parking lot seemed well lit but it wasn't full of vehicles and 
shoppers in a daylight, middle of the day what one might to be the level 
foot traffic or car traffic outside a Wal-Mart. There were some 
outside apparently on a smoke break. 
indication--or the information that Officer Harrison had was that a 
a Had store. 
can 
was unsure \Vas doing. 
Harrison, in 
parked. 
of 
He almost simultaneously saw the male who was had been [sic] described 
to and who now turns out to be Michael Sean Harrison leaving that Wal-Mart 
store with grocery bags in his hand or merchandise bags in his hand. 
Mr. Harrison had been described by the manager from inside the store to 
dispatch who then described to Officer Harrison that it looked like maybe 
Mr. Harrison was getting ready to do the old car push, as they call it, load up a 
cart and then run it out of the store to a waiting car. 
But he didn't He paid for the items that he was brining out in the bags 
he had. He was described a manner that certainly led, reasonably, Officer 
Harrison to believe that the man approaching the scene. 30 to 35 years old, in his 
30s, black hooded sweatshirt and some shorts, \Vas the same man that the manager 
had been talking about. 
The officer certainly did direct Harrison, Michael Sean Harrison to 
come toward him and to lay down the merchandise that was in Mr. Harrison [sic] 
hands. He said so not aggressively, but with some direction to come here and lay 
your items down. Your stuff down. 
Mr. Michael Sean Harrison complied with that. The officer explained to 
suspect, Mr. Harrison, that he was there on a shoplifting complaint, I guess, or 
information about the woman and he himself, Mr. Harrison. Mr. Harrison said he 
had bought the items that he brought out. Officer Harrison indicated clearly that 
he was going to make sure that Mr. had no on him and engaged 
ma search. 
During that search, the could see on Exhibit 1 that Mr. Harrison 
did become somewhat agitated at the woman that got out of the vehicle that 
had been sitting in and \Vas staring at her pretty-I don't know about 
certainly an unhappy manner that maybe she had engaged in 
some conduct that got him in a situation where he is getting patted down. And 
based on that rising level of agitation on the part of Mr. Harrison, Officer 
Harrison decided to place Mr. Harrison in handcuffs given that circumstance. 
The Court heard Officer Harrison inform Mr. Harrison that he was not 
under arrest, but he was just being detained and really made the comment that 
"You're being detained until I can figure out what happened." What all had 
happened at this scene. 
He asks Mr. Harrison during the pat-down search is anything in there 
that would poke me or stick me or anything like that? And Mr. Harrison said no. 
He asked what is in your pockets and there was an answer regarding coin or 
change, I wasn't exactly hearing that, but I accept counsel's representations that it 
was either coins or change. 
Officer Harrison then asked if-and asked Mr. Harrison words to the 
effect of "Would you mind ifI empty your pockets partly to make sure if there's 
anything stolen in there?" I heard Mr. answer m affirmative the 
2 
I.) 
a controlled 
Mr Harrison filed a motion to the seized against him, arguing 
Harrison unlawfully pat consent was 
involuntary. (R., pp.44-58.) reasonable suspicion supported the 
and s 
to empty his pockets. (R., pp.62-77.) 
The district court denied the motion. (R., p.82.) It held the and detention was 
supported by reasonable suspicion, it not was justified 
pat did not evidence, and 
to (1 5 p.51, 
a to a 
his 
pp.I 107.) The court sentenced to with 
1 It is unclear whether the district court considered the preliminary in deciding 
the motion to suppress. State cited to the preliminary hearing transcript once in its briefing 
p. 70), but the court did not on 
hearing transcript (see 1/26/15 Tr., p.4, Ls.11-13 (the court stating that it had read the parties' 
briefing, but not mentioning the preliminary hearing transcript).) It is worth noting, however, 
one discrepancy between Officer Harrison's testimony at the two hearings. At the preliminary 
hearing, Officer Harrison testified that Mr. Harrison consented to a pat down search (11/7/14 
Tr., p. l 0, Ls.13-15), while at the suppression hearing he testified that he simply told 
Mr. Harrison was going to do a pat-search (1/26/15 Tr., p.30, Ls.15-19). As the dash camera 
video makes clear, Mr. Harrison never consented to a pat search-Officer Harrison simply told 
him to turn around so he could make sure Mr. Harrison did not have any weapons. (State's 
Exhibit 1 to 1/26/15 motion to suppress hearing ("Ex. l "), 5:16:46-5:16:54.) 
3 
fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.117-19.) Mr. Harrison timely appealed. (R., pp.120-
22.) The court has since placed Mr. Harrison on probation. (Judgment on Retained 
Jurisdiction2.) 
2 Mr. Harrison attached this document to his motion to augment, which he filed along with this 
brief. 
4 
court 
5 
1 Idaho 302 (Ct 2006). This Court the trial court's findings of fact if 
are supported by substantial 
principles to the facts as found. Id 
freely reviews the application of constitutional 
The United States and Idaho Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures . 
. S. CONST. amend. IV; IDAHO CONST. art I, § 17. Warrantless searches and seizures are 
presumptively unreasonable. S'chneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Halen v. 
136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002). To overcome that presumption, the State has the burden of 
proving that the search or seizure falls within a vvell-recognized exception to the warrant 
and was reasonable m light of the surrounding circumstances. Schneckloth, 
412 V. 
V. 
fails to meet this 
later-discovered 
inadmissible. Wong Sun v. United 
511,51 9 (2012). 
Officer Harrison's with 
suspicion did not support 
384 U 757, 767 (1966) (overruled on other grounds 
3)): Halen, 136 at 
acquired as a result of the illegal or 
derived from original search, 1s 
371 U.S. I, 485 (1963); State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 
Harrison was illegal from beginning to end. First, 
stop, detention, or pat search. Further, 
Mr. Harrison was illegally detained and pat searched when he gave his consent to empty his 
pockets, that consent was invalid. Finally, even if Mr. Harrison was legally detained and pat 
6 
consent it court 
Suspicion 
pass muster the Fourth must generally be 
based on probable cause. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983). However, limited 
detentions are permissible by an officer's reasonable articulable 
that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a " V. 
articulable 
suspicion requires 
more than a mere hunch or ,a ... ,uv«l'-' and unparticularized suspicion. The test for reasonable 
suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances knovm to 
" Id. (internal and omitted). 
court was 
5 p.51, 
not 
individual has committed an offense." (1/26/15 Tr., p.51, Ls.15-18.) 
at or before the time 
cause 
an officer 
suspects each 
the court appears 
to have found sufficient suspicion that Mr. Harrison had something to do with 
Morales's 
3 The State also conceded this point. (R., pp.62-73.) As argued by defense counsel below, 
Officer Harrison detained Mr. Harrison when he said "step over here," "set your stuff down," 
and "tum around for me" and "I'm going to make sure you don't have any weapons." (See 
R., pp.51-52 (citing State v. Cardenas, 143 Idaho 903, 908 (Ct. App. 2006) ("When the deputy 
told Cardenas "he needed to come speak to [the deputy]," under the circumstances, Cardenas was 
seized."); see also Ex., 5:16:32-5:16:52; 1/26/15 Tr., p.30, Ls.1-19.) 
7 
was 
[T]he information that he had was that the had been committed; the theft of 
of and the woman been together the store 
to a articulable to 
people had been involved in the theft. Notwithstanding the fact that he was 
advised that Mr. Harrison had paid for the items that he was carrying out in the 
bags to that car. 
It doesn 't have to-there doesn 't have to be reasonable and articulable 
suspicion that Air. Harrison hacl, in fact, committed an offense but that he was 
involved with someone who had Did he know something about it? Was he aiding 
and abetting in it? Did he have inforrnation about it? The status quo needed to 
be maintained while that preliminary investigation into that shoplifting event was 
conducted. 
And the Court finds that there ,,ere reasonable and articulable suspicions 
to support Officer Harrison detaining Mr. Harrison. It ,vas reasonable for Officer 
Harrison to handcuff Mr. Harrison, given the little bit of the rising agitation that 
Mr. Harrison had ... 
5 Tr., p.51, LI9 p.52, LIS (emphasis added).) 
Contrary to the district coU1i's conclusion, Officer Harrison did not have reasonable 
to believe Harrison had to Ms. acnme 
was that 
store and 
in a Subaru in the the 
still inside the store." ( 1/26/ 15 L.23 - 1.) Dispatch a man 
. Harrison's description had 
leave without paying for them. (1 
a cart and the 
5 Tr., p.27, 
store bags in hand, dispatch 
was concerned he was going to 
But after Mr. Harrison left the 
paid 
items.4 (1/26/15 Tr., p.23, Ls.6-8.) Dispatch did not say that Mr. Harrison had hidden anything 
in his pockets or otherwise stolen anyihing. (1/26/15 Tr., p.27, Ls.15-25.) 
4 The State made two representations in its briefing below which are unsupported by the 
evidence in this case. It claimed that when Mr. Harrison was inside the store with the cart of 
8 
There was thus no reasonable susp1c1on to believe that Mr. Harrison had helped 
Ms. Morales commit a crime. As an initial matter, the district court's claim that Officer Harrison 
could stop Mr. if he was merely with someone have committed a 
crime is legally incorrect. ( l /26/15 Tr., p.52, L8.) As explained above, Officer Harrison needed 
specific, articulable facts to show that Mr. Harrison was involved in a crime, not simply that he 
may have been involved with someone who may have committed a crime. See A!organ, 
154 Idaho at 112. 
Further, the district court's finding that "Mr. Harrison and the woman had been together 
in the store at the place where the crime was committed" is clearly erroneous. (1/26/15 Tr., p.51, 
Ls.21-22.) Officer Harrison did not testify that he was told Mr. Harrison and Ms. Morales were 
together in the store. Instead, he testified that he was told there were two suspects, and that he 
assumed they were together: 
My concerns were that they were together because that's what been reported 
to me that there was a male and a female subject. She was in the passenger seat 
which led me to think the driver was somewhere. I made the assumption, I 
suppose, that the driver was more likely than not to be the male suspect that was 
given to me. 
(1/26/15 Tr., p.23, L.20 - p.24, L.1 (emphasis added).) This testimony makes clear that dispatch 
did not tell Officer Harrison that Mr. and Ms. Morales had been seen in the store 
together,5 much that Mr. Harrison had something to do with Morales shoplifting the 
merchandise, "he noticed the manager near the door [ and] turned the cart around and returned to 
the interior portion of the store," and that dispatch told Officer Harrison that Mr. Harrison "had 
paid for some of the merchandise that had been in the shopping cart and had possibly returned 
some of the items." (R., p.68.) There is no evidence to support those claims. 
5 In its brief below, the State represented that "[ s ]tore personnel suspected that the female 
shoplifter must have come with another party based on their belief that by entering the passenger 
seat another person had been driving. They noted the suspicious behavior of a male in the store 
who appeared to be attempting to leave the store with a shopping cart full of merchandise 
without paying for it." (R., p.68.) 
9 
Officer as cannot provide reasonable 
a 
store. Instead, Harrison testified he stopped Mr. Harrison "based on prior 
of people that have committed theft shoplifting into store [sic] and still paid 
some merchandise." (1/26/15 Tr., p.24, Ls. I .) Officer Harrison's observation that sometimes 
818 
shoplift some things while paying for others \Vould apply to literally every person who 
at a store, and cannot amount to reasonable suspicion. Officer Harrison had no 
suspicion to support stopping and detaining Mr. Harrison, the interaction was 
from the outset. 
1 (1 recognized 
an 
of a 
V. 146 Idaho 804, 
at 16). is justified only "at the moment 
officer has reason to believe that individual or is IS 
dangerous to the orto and initial stages of 
encounter the officer's belief." Bishop, 146 at 818 ( quoting U.S. at 
30). 
The district court that it was not going to decide whether the pat search 
was justified: 
10 
as 
or in his pockets 
search does not inexorably lead to Officer Harrison asking the consent to 
empty the pockets. 
the Court make no conclusion about 
to support the pat-down search because the Court finds is not we might 
call an exclusive nexus between the pat down and the ultimate search of the 
(1 5Tr.,p.53,Ls.3-l6.) 
First, district court erroneously concluded that it did not 
(1 
Ls.7-18; 
The 
was justified 
1, 5:17:58-5:18:02.) 
case are 
2000). court 
was no nexus 
could 
middle his 
admitted were not ( 
to 
as 
(1 5 p.33, 
identical to 
11 
to whether the 
and the 
asked 
search." 
Officer 
a 
Officer 
1, L.25 
p.34, p.35, 
Idaho 870 
directly 
between frisk and Kerley's 
irrevocably intertwined and that 
taint of the unlawful frisk. 
frisk, the 
object \vas. 
not 
consent 
was no appreciable lapse of time 
consent. We conclude that the events were 
s consent, therefore, did not purge the 
at 875. Here too, Mr. Harrison's consent \Vas irrevocably intertwined with the pat search. 
(1 
Therefore, if Officer Harrison unlawfully pat searched Mr. Harrison, the unlawful pat 
rendered the consent he gave during that search invalid. id; infra, pp.13-14. The 
court by not deciding whether Officer Harrison unlawfully pat searched 
the pat \Vas not justified because Officer Harrison had no reason to 
that Mr. Harrison was 
Q: 
didn't 
A: 
Q: You never 
A: 
at 
Q: you had no information 
Correct. 
Q: And you proceeded to 
Correct. 
5 1, 7.) 
and presently dangerous. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 818 
did not 
to 
or is that right? 
him? 
Instead, Officer Harrison testified that when he pulled in behind the Subaru, he had 
general concerns about his safety: "At that point in I was still there alone. I couldn't tell 
what i-,u~,,- was doing. I couldn't see, you know, at all what was doing in the vehicle 
12 
out 
or along his 
\Vere." (1/26/15 15, 
on 
10-1 .) 
me " (1 5 
was 
things I 
Those circumstances did not justify a pat search. Again, Officer Harrison admitted that 
no reason to was or (1/26/15 Tr., 1, 7.) 
That Harrison was carrying ..,v,uvLHH,,F, in his pockets, like any ordinary citizen would 
could not as much. (1 5 Tr., p.15, 10-15.) If 
was the 
(I 5 Tr., p.14, arrived on scene to deal with 
Morales just as 5 15 - 1, 
p.1 1 ), 
no reason to 
events are at 
and the length of time no, 'l>,PF•n the consent ,, 
an illegal the 
6 out to a (1 5 
13 
is " 
it a an 
at 875. 
consent to empty vvas That consent came during 
an illegal detention and an illegal pat search. explained above, Officer Harrison asked to 
Mr. Harrison's in the middle of the search after a small item m 
Harrison's 10-11.) were no intervening circumstances or any 
lapse of time the illegal conduct and two occurred simultaneously. 
Kerley, 1 Idaho at 875. Because Mr. was illegally detained pat his 
cannot consent. 
( 
no more a mere 
knowing, intelligent, and 
143 Idaho 94, 
determination. 
the 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 
consent. 
was applied, 
acquiescence 
391 at 
would 
the Fourth 
not constitute 
State v. Jaborra, 
consent was the product of coercion is a factual 
412 at 229. state a heavy to 
consent was given freely and voluntarily." Zavala, 134 Idaho at 536. 
To determine whether a defendant voluntarily gave consent, the court must assess "the 
totality of all the surrounding circumstances-both the characteristics of the accused and the 
14 
41 at see V. l 
at 
defendant was to number of officers the 
to the regarding constitutional rights. 1 Idaho at 778; see also 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226 (considering 1) whether Miranda warnings were given; (2) the 
the accused; (3) level of or intelligence; ( 4) the length of 
detention; ( 5) repeated and prolonged nature of the and (6) deprivation of 
food or "Because factual situation surrounding consent to a is unique, [the 
Comi] may also into account any factors that [it] relevant." Liberal v. 
632 F.3d 1064, 1 (9th Cir. 2011 ). 
district court found the consent was voluntary: 
an analysis 
was an at scene; the 
was not were two to handle two potential 
suspects or even one and one involved person or with information. 
Court the location the conditions. This was in a public 
area, in a parking of a normally but it was at a the 
morning when it \Vas not a lot of foot traffic or car traffic there [sic]. Somewhat 
remote location, but not as if it was out of public or off in some 
secluded place .... It wasn't an inherently location or condition. It was 
a lighted parking lot . . . were people [sic] it was ma 
public setting. 
Officer did not 
clearly advised him "You are not under arrest. You are being detained we 
can figure out what happened in this suspected shoplifting." .... 
He was Harrison was not advised of his right to refuse consent 
The case law is clear that police need not advise that. And that factor does 
not make consent an invalid or involuntary consent. 
The Court also makes the finding that it observed both in the 
the Court saw in Exhibit l and in the tone of voice used by Officer Harrison in 
15 
(1 5 p.54, L.6 p.55, L.25.) 
Contrary to the district court's conclusion, did not voluntarily consent to 
Officer Harrison's request to empty his pockets because the circumstances of the interaction 
were that a reasonable person would not feel to refuse consent. As the dash camera 
shows, Mr. Harrison's consent came only after Officer Harrison said "excuse me sir, step 
right over here for me," ordered him three times to your stuff down for me," then "step right 
over for me," ''turn for and "I'm going to make sure you don't have any 
15 Tr., p.30, Ls.1-19.) Officer Harrison then 
Mr. Harrison: "Spread (three times) " and "don't talk to her, talk 
to Mr. just being 
I, 5: 1 : 1 to 
like that. 1, 5:17:58-5:18:02.) 
you if I make sure s no merchandise or 
Harrison said "yeah, man." I, 5: I :18:09.) 
person in those circumstances would not felt free to refuse consent. 
Officer Harrison had been ordering Mr. around, Harrison was not free to leave, 
Harrison had detained Mr. Harrison in handcuffs, Officer Harrison did not 
Mr. Harrison that he could refuse to consent. Mr. Harrison's consent \Vas not voluntary and the 
fruits of that must suppressed. 
16 
reverse 
this 5111 16. 
Deputy State Appellate Public 
17 
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